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Note: New Developments in Allocation of Income

Among Commonly Controlled Entities
Under Section 482
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code' vests broad dis-

cretionary power in the Commissioner to readjust the stated income and expenses of commonly controlled taxpayers. It provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized
in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among
such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that
such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
To justify a Section 482 allocation, then, the Commissioner must
find that (1) there are two or more "organizations, trades, or
businesses" (2) "owned or controlled" by the "same interests"
and (3) that the allocation is necessary to prevent tax evasion or
to clearly reflect income. Prevention of tax evasion and clear
reflection of income are independent bases for asserting Section
482.2 Thus the Commissioner's power is not limited to cases of
tax evasion but may be invoked in any case where, by inadvertence or design, there has been a diversion of income through
non-arm's length transactions3 from the entity which generated
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954.

2. Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952). Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1968).
3. The regulations provide that the standard to be used in judging
the propriety of transactions between commonly controlled entities is
that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another
uncontrolled taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (1) (1962). While the
courts have generally upheld the use of the arm's length standard, see,
e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct CL 1967), some
recent decisions in the area of intercompany pricing might be read to
permit the use of other tests by taxpayers to justify less than strict
arm's length dealings. See, e.g., PPG Industries, Inc., 55 T.C. 928 (1970);
Greene & Hobbet, Substantial Business Activity, Reasonable Allocations
Needed to Thwart 482 Adjustment, 34 J. TAXATION 113 (1971); Morrione,
Lilly to Lufkin-An Interpretationof Court Thinking on Intercompany
Pricing, 3 TAx AnvisER 74 (1972). Some commentators, however, see
any differences in approach as "probably more of a semantic nature
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it to another entity within the controlled group. 4
An example of Section 482 allocation may be helpful at this
point. A and B are brother-sister corporations. A sells goods to
B at cost, whereas it would have charged an unrelated party a
higher price. The purpose of the transaction is to take full advantage of B's net operating loss carryovers by thus shifting
taxable income from A to B when B resells the goods at arm's
length prices. The application of the arm's length standard
would dictate that, for tax purposes, a portion of B's income be
allocated to A with B's income being reduced accordingly. A
and B would be taxed as if A had earned the income allocated to
it thus resulting in an increase in the total taxes paid by the
controlled group. Once made, the Commissioner's allocation will
be reversed only if the taxpayer carries the heavy burden of
proving it to be arbitrary or capricious.
An allocation may also involve adverse collateral consequences, foremost of which is the threat of constructive dividend
treatment. Since a Section 482 allocation entails only a transfer
of the tax incidents of the income allocated, A's income, in the
above example, is increased for tax purposes though the funds
themselves remain with B. The Commissioner's position has
been that this should be reflected by viewing the transaction as
a dividend distribution, made by A to the controlling shareholder, in an amount equal to the difference between an arm's
length price and the bargain price. In theory, this would be followed by a capital contribution in that amount from the shareholder to B. 6 Under this view, the shareholder could also incur
than of practical substance." B. BiTTr.ER & J. EusTcE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 15-29 (3d ed. 1971). This

interpretation is supported by the recent decision in Lufkin Foundry and
Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied,
468 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. "The term 'controlled taxpayer' means any one of two or
more organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (4) (1962).
"The terms 'group' and 'group of controlled taxpayers' mean the organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled by the same interests." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (5) (1962).
5. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 31 B.T.A. 1152, aff'd, 79 F.2d 234 (2d
Cir. 1935).

6. Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 112; Rev. Proc. 65-31,
§ 4.04(3), 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 1024, 1037. See Jenks, Constructive Dividends Resulting from Section 482 Adjustments, 24 TAX LAWYER 83
(1970).
However, the courts have not upheld constructive dividend
treatment where the intercorporate transaction: (1) was motivated by a
corporate business purpose, rather than a tax avoidance purpose or

19731

SECTION 482

a tax liability.7 A possible collateral consequence for a personal
holding company is that its personal holding income may be increased above permissible levels by an allocation, subjecting undistributed amounts to a penalty rate.8 And if one member of
a controlled group is a Western Hemisphere trade corporation,
an allocation from it may reduce its income below the required
levels, causing it to lose the special deduction granted such corporations. 9 In short, the possible collateral consequences are
both numerous and severe for several classes of taxpayers when
a Section 482 allocation is made.' 0
Since much has already been written on Section 482,11 this
Note will be limited to current developments in the effort to delineate the boundaries of the Commissioner's power.' 2 The discussion will focus on (1) the scope of the requirement of "two
a personal objective of the common shareholder; and (2) produced no
benefit or only an incidental rather than a direct benefit to the shareholder. Loening, Section 482 Allocations Resulting in the Creation of
Income or in Constructive Dividends to Shareholders, 30 INST. FED. TAXATION 1247 (1972).

7. Although the term "constructive dividend" is used, the tax
treatment of amounts constructively distributed should be determined
under Section 301(c). Thus, a distribution would be a dividend under
Section 316 only to the extent of the earnings and profits of the corporation which is deemed to have made the distribution.
8. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 541. This result is specifically indicated in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) (3) (example 3) (1968).
9.

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 921, 922.

10. See generally Aland, Section 482: 1971 Version, 49 TAxES 815,
833 (1971); O'Connor, Side Effects of Section 482 Can Be More Serious
Than OriginalAllocation, 31 J. TAXATION 194 (1969).
11. A complete listing at this point would not be useful, but for a
general overview of the section see the following: B. BrrrKEn & J.
EUsTICE, supra note 3, at
15.06; Aland, supra note 10; Asbill, The Application of Section 482 to Domestic Taxpayers-Current Status and
Trends, 1967 So. CALi. TAx INsT. 673; Eustice, Tax Problems Arising
from Transactions Between Affiliated or Controlled Corporations, 23
TAx LAw REV.451 (1968); Seieroe & Gerber, Section 482-Still Growing

at the Age of 50, 46 TAXES 893 (1967).
12. This conflict has intensified in recent years. Although Section
45 of the Revenue Act of 1928 contained language almost identical to
that of present Section 482, the Commissioner rarely used it, and the
section became known as the "silent policeman." In the 1950's, resort
to this power in the foreign area was more frequent, especially following
audit activities of the Office of International Operations. In the last
few years, a steady increase in the application of Section 482 to foreign
operations has been followed by its expanded use in purely domestic
areas. For a history of the section, see Spaeth, Section 482-Past and
Future, 47 TAxES 45 (1969). See generally J. SEIDMAN, SEWMAN's LEaisLATIVm HmTony orFEDERAL INcoME TAX LAws (1953-39) (1954); J. SEmmAN, SEmeAN'S LEGISLATIE HISTORY or FEDERAL INcOME TAx Laws

(1938-1861) (1938).
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or more organizations, trades, or businesses"; (2) the shifting
emphasis in the common control requirement; and (3) the Commissioner's attempted use of Section 482 to "create" rather than
allocate existing income. Thereafter, the discussion will deal
with the appropriate sphere for Section 482's operation in relation to other Code sections and judicially established tax principles.
Ir. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
A.

THE REQUIREMENT OF

Two

OR MORE ORGANIZATIONS,

TRADES, OR BUSINESSES

Section 482 applies only where there are two or more "organizations, trades, or businesses." As a result of the broad scope
4
of these terms 13 and the exhaustive coverage of the regulations,"
this requirement has not been the subject of much litigation.
Uncertainty and conflict have often arisen, however, when the
Commissioner attempts to allocate income from a closely held
corporation to a shareholder-employee. The regulations specifically include sole proprietorships within the scope of Section
482,15 so that income earned by an individual's sole proprietorship but arbitrarily shifted to a corporate enterprise under his
control may be allocated back to the proprietorship. What is not
clear under either the statutory language or the regulations is
whether Section 482 also applies where an individual performs
services as an employee of his corporation. In these situations,
the issue is whether the individual is an "organization" or his
rendition of services constitutes a "trade or business" separate
from the corporation so that two entities are present.
13. Indeed, the term "organization" was added to the Code by
the Revenue Act of 1934 specifically to remove any doubt as to the
application of this section to all kinds of business activity, H.R. REI,.
No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
14. The term 'organization' includes any organization of any
kind, whether it be a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a trust,
an estate, an association, or a corporation (as each is defined or
understood in the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations
thereunder), irrespective of the place where organized, where

operated, or where its trade or business is conducted, and re-

gardless of whether domestic or foreign, whether exempt,
whether affiliated, or whether a party to a consolidated return.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (1) (1962). "The term 'trade' or 'business' includes any trade or business activity of any kind, regardless of whether
or where organized, whether owned individually or otherwise, and regardless of the place where carried on." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (2)
(1962).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (1) (1962).
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Application of Section 482 to an Individual
Independently ProducingIncome

In Borge v. Commissioner,'0 the Second Circuit upheld an
allocation where the shareholder of a shell corporation attempted to offset unrelated personal income by channeling the
personal income and transferring the net operating losses of his
sole proprietorship to the corporation. The taxpayer conducted
an unsuccessful poultry operation (ViBo Farms) as a proprietorship. Due to individual loss deductions previously taken, continued losses would have subjected Borge to recomputation of
tax under existing hobby farm provisions. 7 He therefore transferred the operation to Danica, a newly formed and wholly
owned corporation. Borge then entered into a personal service
contract authorizing Danica to sell his artistic services on television, radio, and in theatrical performances for a yearly fee of
$50,000. Danica sold Borge's services to third parties, realizing
an average net income of $166,465, but paying Borge nothing during four of the years in question.
The Commissioner determined that Borge actually controlled two separate businesses, ViBo Farms and his own entertainment business, and allocated a portion of the entertainment
income to him. Borge argued that his entertainment services
did not constitute a separate organization, trade, or business under Section 482. He relied on the Second Circuit's own decision
in Commissioner v. Gross,'8 where it ruled that shareholder-officers of a close corporation could render services to it without
compensation and without treatment of their capital withdrawals as salaries. However, the Second Circuit concluded that the
Commissioner correctly found Borge in control of two separate
16. 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), atfg, modifying and remanding
26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 816 (1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969).
17. ViBo Farms was heading for its fifth consecutive year of
losses in excess of $50,000, which would have triggered recomputation
of tax under Section 270 of the Code. (Repealed by Act of Dec. 30,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 213(b), 83 Stat. 572).
18. 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956). Gross involved cash distributions
to the shareholders of several construction corporations, including
three experienced builders who also acted as president, secretary, and
treasurer of the corporations. The distributions were supported by a
surplus created when the corporations revalued their real estate to reflect appreciation. The Second Circuit rejected the Commissioner's contention that amounts distributed in excess of current and accumulated
earnings and profits were anticipatory distributions of future profits
and should therefore be taxed as ordinary income. It also refused to
treat any portion of the distributions to the officer-shareholders as salaries or fees for the services they rendered.
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businesses and upheld the partial allocation. 19 It distinguished
Gross on the ground that Borge was not devoting his efforts to
Danica in the hope of enhancing his investment in the corporation but was merely continuing his individual entertainment
business and channeling ordinary income through the corporation.

20

The court apparently felt that the essence of the entertainment business remained with Borge and was not transferred to
Danica. 21 In this regard, the nature of the services rendered
seemed to be of primary significance. Borge possessed unique
artistic abilities totally unrelated to the rest of Danica's operations, and his prior individual earnings attested to the fact that
he was capable of generating income independent of the corporation's operations. In Gross, by contrast, the three individuals
who controlled the corporation performed services which admittedly required a certain amount of expertise but which were
valuable only insofar as they contributed to the production of
22
income by the corporation as a whole.
Although the Borge decision was significant in allowing application of the organization, trade, or business concept to an individual, it did not represent a radical extention of Section
19. 405 F.2d at 675.

20. Id. at 676. Borge also relied on Whipple v. Commissioner,
373 U.S. 193 (1963). There, the Supreme Court held that furnishing organizational, promotional and managerial services to corporations for
an economic benefit equivalent to that which would flow to an investor
in those corporations is not a trade or business. It thus characterized
losses incurred by a sole shareholder in connection with such activities
as capital rather than ordinary losses. Apparently, Borge placed pri-

mary reliance on Whipple rather than Gross, although the latter is

more relevant to the issue of whether an individual should be treated
as a separate income generating entity. While both decisions deal with
the existence or nonexistence of a "trade or business," that term has
different connotations when used in connection with the deductibility of
losses and nonbusiness debts. The court, however, distinguished Whipple and Gross on the same grounds.
21. The court emphasized that Danica did nothing to earn or assist
in earning the entertainment income and that those contracting with
Danica required Borge's personal guarantee. The Tax Court had similarly concluded:
[Tlhere was no change in the conduct of his entertainment
business after [Danica's incorporation]. Its earnings were attributable to the services of Victor.
26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 816, 820 (1967).
22. Similarly, this situation was not like that in Whipple where the
shareholder's activities were confined to transactions necessary to provide equipment and financing for a new corporate business, the reward
for such services being contingent upon the corporation's subsequent
successful operation.
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482.23 The situation there strongly resembled that in which income is shifted from a proprietorship to a commonly controlled
close corporation, a situation which is clearly covered by the
Regulations. Consequently, the court was not forced to consider the Commissioner's more expansive suggestion that a shareholder-employee might always constitute a separate organiza24
tion, trade, or business for Section 482 purposes.
2. Expansion of the Organization, Trade or Business Concept
to TraditionalEmployment Relationships
The decisions in two other cases expanded the scope of Section 482 to a point where the Commissioner's suggestion must
be seriously considered. Unlike Borge, both cases involved individuals who seemed to fit the traditional employee concept, but
in each case an allocation of income from the corporate employer
to the individual was upheld. In Pauline W. Ach, 2 5 the sole proprietress of a profitable dress shop sold its assets to a family corporation which had sustained substantial operating losses in the
dairy business. Although the sale agreement did not contain an
employment contract to render further services, Ach continued
to actively conduct the dress business without receiving a salary
from the corporation. For four years, the net operating loss carryovers of the defunct dairy business were used to offset the
earnings of the dress business.2 0 The Tax Court rejected the
Commissioner's allocation of all the corporation's profits for
these years to Ach, but it did determine that a partial allocation
was appropriate.
The crux of the Tax Court's opinion was that Ach retained
the vital aspects of the dress business, despite the transfer of
its tangible assets to the corporation. The court reasoned that
the single most important element of the successful business
was Ach's active participation as "manager and guiding spirit."
This had not been transferred to the corporation, as evidenced
by the fact that she was neither bound to it by an employment
23.

See Kauder, The Service Corporation as the Taxpayer's Alter

Ego: Variations on the Borge Theme, 28 N.Y.U. 28Ta INsT. ON FED. TAx.
1109 (1970).
24. Brief for Commissioner at 24, Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d
673 (2d Cir. 1968); cited in Kauder, supra note 23, at 1134.
25. 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 899 (1966).

26. This facilitated payment out of current profits of a non-interest
bearing demand note given Ach for the dress business assets as well as
other corporate notes given for previous advances by the father.
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contract nor prohibited by a covenant not to compete. The court
therefore found that Ach herself was, in a sense, still a separate
27
entity.
28
In the most recent decision in this area, Richard A. Rubin,
the Tax Court again upheld application of the organization,
trade, or business concept to an individual rendering only management services. Rubin obtained an option to purchase a majority interest in Dorman Mills, a textile corporation which had
been operating at a loss. To revitalize Dorman, Rubin formed
another corporation (Park) in which he received a majority interest. The purpose of the corporation ostensibly was to deal in
art works. Park and Dorman then entered into a contract
whereby Park would provide Rubin's management services to
Dorman. Rubin received considerably less in salary from Park
than Park received in management fees from Dorman and the
Commissioner allocated the difference to him.
As in Ach and Borge, the taxpayer argued that he was a
mere employee devoting his efforts only for the sake of his investment in Park. In addition, Rubin had an argument not
available in Ach and Borge: unlike the individuals in those
cases, he had not previously engaged in business in proprietorship form, so it could not be maintained that he was continuing
the operation of what was clearly a trade or business prior to
the formation of his corporation. He warned that to uphold an
allocation here would mean that the Commissioner could always
treat corporate employment as a separate trade or business under Section 482 in order to increase the inadequate salaries of
corporate employees.
The Tax Court rejected these contentions, relying heavily
on Ach and Borge. It determined that Rubin was not merely an
employee of Park but was engaged in an independent trade or
business, the rendering of management services to Dorman. 29
Previous operation in proprietorship form was not regarded as
27.

The court observed:
Pauline certainly conducted Vogues and Vanities as an individual prior to August 1, 1953, and, as such, she was a taxpayer of the character referred to in Section 482. Similarly,
the corporation is a separate taxpayer covered by this statute.
And Pauline did not cease to be a separate taxpayer or "organization," "trade," or "business" within the purview of these provisions by reason of her "sale" of the naked assets of the dress
business to the corporation.
42 T.C. at 124.
28. 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), affd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
29. His management services, declared the court, were the "clear
counterpart" of Borge's entertainment services. 56 T.C. at 1159.
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pivotal, but as merely one of many factors to be considered.
The court found more persuasive the fact that Rubin's services
were rendered to parties other than his putative employer.
Moreover, since he had no contract with Park, he could freely
have terminated its right to receive compensation for his services, thus retaining complete control over the corporation's production of income. 30 The court concluded:
We merely hold, as is the clear import of both the Ach
and Borge decisions, that where the particular facts of a case
are such as to justify a finding that a shareholder operated an
independent business and merely assigned to the corporation a
portion of the income therefrom, the business activity of the
taxpayer may constitute a trade or business to which allocation
of all or part of the income attributable to his efforts is authorized under Section 482.31
Both Ach and Rubin can be viewed as expanding the scope
of Section 482 through a liberal application of the organization,
trade, or business concept to shareholder-employees of close corporations. The former decision appears to be more significant in
terms of future development. Unlike the entertainment activities in Borge, Ach's managerial activities were directly related
to the operation of the corporate dress business. Moreover, her
management services were not income-producing alone, but were
of the type traditionally rendered to an employer and depended
upon the corporation's assets and labor. In short, Ach was much
more similar to the shareholder-officers in a typical close corporation than she was to an individual diverting income from one
business entity to another. Basically, her maneuvers involved
the incorporation by an individual of a going business, a practice
32
recognized under the Code as a legitimate course of action.
There were, of course, obviously unauthorized tax avoidance
motives for the incorporation, but a more appropriate remedy
would have been the disallowance of the net operating loss carryovers under Section 269.33
The Rubin decision seems to affirm the liberal application of
Section 482, but on facts less extreme than those in Ach. Rubin,
30. Id. at 1160.
31. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
32. A taxpayer is generally privileged to decrease or even avoid
taxes through incorporation so long as the substance and form of the
transaction coincide. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
33. Section 269 authorizes the Commissioner to disallow corporate
deductions, credits, or allowances where the securing of such benefits
for tax avoidance or evasion was the principal purpose for acquisition of
the corporation. In fact, this section was successfully invoked by the
Commissioner here in addition to Section 482.
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too, was engaged in management activities not in themselves income producing, but, like Borge, he was rendering services to another party which were totally unrelated to his employer's art
business. Rubin is most significant for the Second Circuit's dictum concerning the possible expansion of Section 482. Like the
other courts which considered this issue, it refrained from stating whether a shareholder-employee may always be treated as a
separate entity under Section 482. 3 4 But in response to Rubin's
argument that such would be the effect of affirming the allocation, the court commented that "the prospect is not so shocking
'35
to us as to (Rubin's) counsel.
3.

CurrentStandards,Future Threats

Despite the Second Circuit's dictum in Rubin, it does not appear that the courts are ready to extend the organization, trade,
or business concept to all individuals rendering services to
closely held corporations in which they are shareholders. Borge
and Rubin indicate that income will usually be allocated where
the individual's services are the sole factor in the generation of
an independent stream of income and there is a significant disparity between that income and the individual's salary. Where
the individual performs services which are merely a component
of the single identifiable corporate business, an allocation is presumably less likely. Unfortunately, since the Rubin decision,
both situations will apparently be governed by the same vague
"particular facts" test.
a.

The "Particular Facts" Test

As articulated by the court in Rubin, an allocation to an individual under Section 482 will be upheld where the "particular
facts" of the case justify it. In affirming, the Second Circuit
failed to adopt this specific language but nevertheless took a similar approach in its own handling of the case, indicating that it
would continue to decide other cases on their particular facts.
Given the apparently imprecise nature of the organization, trade
34. Like the Tax Court, it concluded that, on these facts, the taxpayer was not a mere employee but rather the renderer of independent
services, stating:
It was Richard Rubin's special ability that Dorman wanted,
and it wanted nothing else from Park insofar as management
services were concerned. This is enough to constitute his rendition of services for compensation a trade or business. ...
Other cases will be decided when they arise.
460 F.2d 1216, 1218.
35.

Id.
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or business concept, it seems clear that this ad hoc approach
will continue.
The above mentioned opinions cite several factors which appear to be significant under the "particular facts" test. The absence of a binding employment contract and the existence of special skills or talents may be sufficiently indicative of an income
producing capability separate from the corporation's to support
an allocation. Such services may include not only entertainment
or other professional skills but also management or entrepreneurial expertise. Previous operation as a proprietorship has
also been cited as important but, since Rubin, is apparently no
longer a major factor. The number of shareholders rendering
services and the entity to which the services are rendered may
also be important. In each of the three cases, there was only
one individual rendering the services which produced or contributed to the corporation's income. This fact situation, in contrast to those situations where the activities are divided among
several shareholders, indicates that the individual alone is the income generator rather than the corporation. In Rubin and
Borge, the Tax Court indicated that it may rely on the fact that
services are rendered directly to third parties rather than to the
individual's own corporation. If the latter is a primary factor,
then the common business practice of "lending" employee services is vulnerable.3 6 A final factor is the existence of a tax
avoidance motive for incorporation. Although tax avoidance is
technically irrelevant in the application of Section 482,37 where
such motive is the primary reason for incorporation, it is likely
that it will bear on the court's decision. In fact, a finding that
the shareholder-employee constitutes a separate trade or business is, in effect, a determination that his activities go beyond
permissible limits of tax minimization through incorporation.
Even if these are the significant factors in determining
whether an allocation will be upheld, prediction of a court's reaction to a specific situation is difficult under the "particular
36. The traditional view has been that a loaned employee performing services for another is merely a conduit through which compensation
flows to the employer. Thus, the compensation remains taxable to the
employer and not to the loaned employee, who is compensated through
his usual salary. Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and
Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAx LAw REv. 293, 391-93
(1962).
37. For example, the Tax Court in Rubin rejected the absence of a
tax avoidance motive for incorporation as a ground for distinguishing
Ach and Borge. 56 T.C. at 1159.
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In addition,

there has been no indication of how many such factors must be
present to support application of the organization, trade, or business concept, nor is it clear that the above factors are the only
possible ones.
b.

Possibilities for Expansion of the Trade or Business Concept

The Ach decision represents the most expansive application
of Section 482 in this area, but it is a relatively old decision and
no recent case has gone quite as far. Nevertheless, the Second
Circuit's dictum in Rubin leaves open the possibility that the rationale of the personal service cases could be extended beyond
Ach to a holding that any shareholder-employee of a corporation
is subject to an allocation under Section 482 where salaries are
low or nonexistent. In Gross, the Second Circuit explicitly
stated that the officers of a corporation are not compelled to
take salaries for their services. In Borge, Ach, and Rubin the
courts nevertheless upheld allocations which indirectly effected
just such a result, even though in two of the cases the allocations were in excess of contractually established salaries.38
Several other Code sections also use the "trade or business"
language. 39 Since it has been held under some of these that being an executive officer of a corporation may constitute a trade
or business, 40 a court could reason that a shareholder-employee
of a close corporation is in a trade or business for Section 482
purposes. The court could take the position that the term should
be uniformly interpreted throughout the Code or, if this is unrealistic, 41 that the conceptual frameworks are similar enough
to at least allow application of judicial concepts developed under
other sections to Section 482. On the other hand, this broad rule
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (6) (1962), which specifically states
that "true taxable income" is not limited to contractually set amounts.
39. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 162, 165, 166, 174, 355, 356,
864, 1402.
TAXATIoN

40.

See generally 4A J.

MERTENS,

LAW

OF FEDERAL INCOMS

§ 25.08 (rev. ed. 1966).

See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 408 F.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1969);

David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 274 (1970). For a discussion of judicial expansion of the "trade or business" concept in this area, see Note, Federal

Income Tax Treatment of Business and Employment Investigatory Expenses, 56 MrNN. L. REV. 1157 (1972).

41. The multitude of different situations in which the term "trade
or business" is used would make the formulation of a comprehensive
definition nearly impossible. Notably, the Service has never published
regulations defining the term.
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would still likely be subject to limitations. Sporadic and infrequent duties or strictly investment activities, for example, have
been held not to constitute a trade or business under other Code
42
provisions.
Since the regulations 43 give the Commissioner the power to
set compensation at an arm's length amount for services rendered between controlled entities, recognizing the shareholderemployee as a separate entity would apparently allow the Com4
missioner to directly raise his salary upward to such an amount."
This action could have further severe consequences if the Commissioner would then take the position that reallocated income
does not qualify as employee compensation for purposes of con45
tributions or benefits under a qualified employee pension plan.
The effects of such a broad application of Section 482 may
be far reaching. Many closely held corporations make bonus or
compensation payments to their shareholder-officers either at
the end of the current taxable year or at the beginning of the
next, depending on the individual's tax situation. In Robert A.
Boyer 4 6 however, the Tax Court recently approved the use of
Section 482 to disregard a delay or acceleration of payments between controlled taxpayers if it results in a tax benefit which
does not clearly reflect income. 47 In light of Rubin and Boyer,
the Commissioner may be expected to use Section 482 to eliminate the ability to time the receipt of income to a shareholderemployee. Similarly, the Service has conceded that lawyers,
42. Jack P. Stanton, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 618 (1967), affd, 399
F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1968); Percy S. Winfield, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 305
(1966), affd, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
851 (1967).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (1) (1968).
44. See Katz, Can Section 482 Be Used to Negate the Tax Effect of
a Bona Fide Corporation?,28 J. TAxATIoN 2, 4 (1968). The Commissioner
already has the power to indirectly adjust such salaries downward by
merely disallowing part of the corporation's deduction under Section
162 (a) (1).

45. Sections 401-406 of the Code provide the rules for establishing
and maintaining qualified pension plans. See generally Horseley &
Dray, Compensating Officer-Stockholders of Professional Corporations:

An Analysis, 34 J. TAXATIoN 146 (1971).
46.

58 T.C. 316 (1972).

47. The court upheld an allocation where a lessor allowed its commonly owned lessee to defer the payment of rent due during the years
in issue. The lessee offset its income, which was increased by the elimination of the rent expense, with losses from another venture. The
taxpayers in Boyer were a corporation and a limited partnership, but
the same result could be reached in regard to a corporation and a
shareholder-employee who is treated as a separate entity.
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physicians and other professionals who organize under professional corporation statutes will be treated as corporations for
tax purposes. 48 As a result of the development in this area,
however, Section 482 may be available to the Commissioner for
corrective action where income is being arbitrarily diverted from
an individual to the corporation. Instead of trying to get a professional service corporation disregarded as a sham, the Commissioner might attempt to allocate a portion of the corporation's
income to one or more of the professionals. 49 Although the tax
consequences of an allocation are generally less harsh than those
resulting where the corporate entity is disregarded, 0 the possibility of such action still poses a significant threat.

B. THE COMMON OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL REQUIREMENT
For Section 482 to be operative, the two or more entities
must be "owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests." Such language lends itself to broad and indefinite
application. 8 1 The use of the disjunctive in "owned or controlled" suggests that the existence of either element alone is
sufficient to support an allocation. This in itself is a deviation
from the approach in other Code sections which generally combine these two elements and define control in terms of ownership. 5 2 Neither term is adequately defined for Section 482 pur48. Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 278, as amplified, Rev.
Rul. 70-455, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 297; Rev. Rul. 71-434, 1971 INT. Rsv.

BULL. No. 39, at 14.
49.

The Commissioner may also resort to Section 482 as an alterna-

tive to the personal holding company or accumulated earnings provisions for forcing earnings out of the corporation. See INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, §§ 543 (d) (7) (a), 532.

50. See, e.g., Jerome J. Roubik, 53 T.C. 365 (1969). There, a professional service corporation was disregarded for tax purposes and all
of its income taxed to its shareholders. In contrast, where the Commissioner does not contest the viability of the professional corporation
it is doubtful that a complete allocation of its income to shareholders
under Section 482 would be sustained. As indicated by the rejection
of total allocations in Borge and Ach, at least a portion of the income
should be attributable to the use of the corporation's equipment and
the activities of its other personnel.
51. It has been suggested that the wording is intentionally vague
to permit flexibility of administration. Plumb & Kapp, Reallocation of
Income and Deductions Under Section 482, 41 TAXES 809, 811 (1963).
52. See, e.g., Sections 269 (control means ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of all voting power or total value of all
stock), 368 (ownership of at least 80 percent of combined voting power
and at least 80 percent of total number of shares) and 1551 (at least 80
percent combined voting power or total value of all stock).
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poses. The requisite ownership should logically exceed some
specified minimum, such as a percentage of voting stock where
corporations are involved, but none is provided in either the
statute or the regulations. The regulations do discuss control
but add little clarification, stating that any kind of control,
whether or not legally enforceable, will qualify and that it is
the "reality" of control, not its form or mode of its existence,
53
which is determinative.
The phrase "directly or indirectly" creates even more uncertainty. As applied to the control concept, this language embraces a variety of situations. In the corporate sphere, direct
control probably includes a situation where the same interests,
though holding less than enough stock to "own" the corporation,
have enough voting power to control it due to the diffusion of
voting power among many interests. Indirect control, then, may
include the situation where a party, though having no ownership
in a second entity, repeatedly exercises dominance over its activities through economic power or other means. In this regard,
the concept of "inferred control"--or for that matter, inferred
ownership-is suggested by the statutory language. For example, where a relationship has consistently been found to be mutually influential, such as that of partners or spouses, ownership
or control of an entity by one party to the relationship could be
inferred from ownership or control of that entity by the other
party. Inferred ownership or control is thus analogous to the
attribution principles for constructive ownership under Section
318. Again, there is nothing in either Section 482 or the regulations which precludes such an interpretation.
Ownership or control must be held by the "same interests."
This phrase seems clearly to contemplate the situation where
two entities dealing at non-arm's length are owned or controlled
by a single person or by a group of people, such as a partnership
or husband and wife. If these are the same interests, then their
individual interests in the entities are, in effect, lumped together
and then collectively considered in determining whether there is
ownership or control. Section 482 could thus be interpreted to
cover the situation where individual family members each own
separate entities. While none of the family members would personally own any two or more entities, at least in the absence of
attribution, the family unit as the "same interests" would own
the whole group of entities.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (3) (1962).
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1. Changing JudicialInterpretation
Despite the possibilities for broad interpretation of the statutory language, the early cases reflected a narrow reading of it,
thereby restricting the scope of Section 482. For example,
courts appeared to ignore the alternative nature of "owned or
controlled" and rejected allocations in the absence of common
ownership of the entities, regardless of whether they were, in
reality, commonly controlled.5 4 Moreover, they refused to apply any type of attribution concept to find common ownership,
even as between husband the wife, 55 and did not regard a family
group as constituting the "same interests."5
In later cases, however, courts adopted a more liberal interpretation. Control and ownership are no longer treated by the
courts as a single element, and allocations may be upheld on the
basis of control without ownership of any kind.Y Similarly,
courts readily find ownership or control by the "same interests"
where members of the same family individually own or control
58
the entities involved.
2.

Shifting the Emphasis

In view of this trend, an anomalous situation existed until
recently in the area of jointly owned subsidiaries. In Lake Erie
& Pitt. Ry.,5 9 two competing railroads each owned 50 per cent of
a subsidiary corporation which owned and operated a terminal
facility shared equally by the parents. Under prior agreements
between the railroads, this facility was leased to them at cost, a
rate which the Commissioner determined to be inadequate. Interpreting the statutory language narrowly, the Tax Court
found that neither railroad held the requisite ownership of the
subsidiary. 60
54. John L. Denning v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 288 (10th Cir.
1950).
55. A.G. Nelson Paper Co., 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 914 (1944).
56. Epsen Lithographers, Inc. v. O'Malley, 67 F. Supp. 181 (D.
Neb. 1946).
57. Jesse E. Hall, Sr., 32 T.C. 390 (1959), aff'd, 294 F.2d 82 (5th
Cir. 1961).
58.

Grenada Industries, Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 873

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953). There, two corporations and
two partnerships were owned by four families in identical proportions.
Upholding an allocation of income among the four entities, the court
declared it immaterial that the legal ownership of the stocks and partnership interests were not in the same persons at the same time.
59. 5 T.C. 558 (1945).
60. The court reasoned:
The question at once arises whether the petitioner and el-
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The court's approach is significant in two respects. First,
as in other early cases, the court did not distinguish between
ownership and control. Apparently deciding that a 50 per cent
stock interest does not constitute ownership, it did not consider
whether there could nevertheless be actual control by either
parent. Second, it rejected the theory that two entities, which
are unrelated except for their joint ownership or control of a
third entity, are the "same interests" within the meaning of
Section 482.61
The Lake Erie approach was reaffirmed on similar facts in
B. Forman & Company, Inc. 2 where two closely held corporations (McCurdy and Forman), with no common shareholders, directors, or officers, owned competing department stores. In an
effort to increase business, they formed a third corporation (Midtown) for the purpose of constructing and operating a mall and

shopping center adjoining their locations. To finance this project, McCurdy and Forman each made a $1 million loan to Mid-

town, which was ultimately evidenced by non-interest bearing
notes. No payment of interest or principal was ever made.
The Commissioner allocated interest income to Forman and
McCurdy under Section 482, urging that they should be considered as having acted in partnership in organizing and operating
ther of the lessee companies are owned by the same interests.
The New York Central and the Pennsylvania are competing
railroad companies. Each of them is controlled by its stockholders. The respondent makes no contention that the stockholders of the New York Central, or any considerable number
of them, are also stockholders of the Pennsylvania. The stockholders of the New York Central are not the "same interests" as
the stockholders of Pennsylvania, and neither the New York
Central nor the Pennsylvania has control of the petitioner.
Together they do have. But that amounts to saying nothing
more than that the stockholders of a corporation control it.
We do not think it can be said that where two or more corporations owned by different sets of stockholders control another corporation such other corporation is controlled by the
same interests.
Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
61. The Commissioner originally acquiesced in the Lake Erie decision. 1945 CmvL BULL. 5. This was not withdrawn until 1965, when
nonacquiescence was substituted. 1965-1 Cu-L BULL. 5. At that time,
he took the position that the Tax Court's narrow interpretation of control by the same interests was inconsistent with the broad statutory
language and disregarded the "realities of the arrangement" Since the
two railroads "were acting in concert, joined by a common interest,"
the reality of control by the same interests was present "no less than
if they had formed a partnership...

."

Rev. Rul. 65-142, 1965-1 Cum.

BuLL.223.
62. 54 T.C. 912 (1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 453 F.2d
1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
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Midtown. The Tax Court refused to sustain the allocation. It
stated that neither Forman nor McCurdy could alone dominate
Midtown, since each held only a 50 per cent interest.0 3 Neither
could it find a group of common shareholders which could be
said to have control of both Forman and McCurdy and thus control of Midtown as well.6 4 The court therefore reasoned that
there was no control by the same interests, declaring:
To import a common objective test into Section 482, and
thereby create a theoretical partnership between Forman's and
McCurdy's would require an unwarranted elasticized reading of
the statutory language. 65
On appeal, the Second Circuit adopted the Commissioner's
reasoning and reversed the Tax Court. Overruling Lake Erie, it
held that Forman and McCurdy had identical interests in Midtown and that together they exercised the requisite control.60
It concluded that the statutory requirement of control by the
"same interests" was satisfied because, whether or not the two
parents were treated as a de facto partnership, they did act in
7
concert rather than in competition with respect to Midtown.
In addition to eliminating a haven for corporate tax dodging, 68 the Forman decision marks a significant shift in emphasis
in regard to the concept of the "same interests." The Tax Court
63. Id. at 922.
64. Id. at 921.

65. Id. at 923.
66. Citing the trend toward the use of actual control as the proper
test, it declared:
To contend that these parents do not control the child is
to fly in the face of reality. They have had complete control of
Midtown from the day of conception (its incorporation)
throughout the years relevant to this case. Every act of Midtown has been dictated by papa and mamma who, directly or
indirectly, have financed its career and controlled its every
move.
In apparent disregard of the reality of the circumstances,
the Tax Court below looked only to the record ownership of
Midtown. Ignored was reality of control of Midtown.
453 F.2d 1144, 1153-54.
67. Id. at 1155. The court further relied on the fact that the interest-free loans resulted in a shifting of the respective incomes and tax
burdens of Forman, McCurdy, and Midtown. Under the regulations, a
presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been arbitrarily shifted. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (3) (1962).
68. The Lake Erie decision had been criticized as unduly restrictive on the Commissioner by several commentators. Hewitt, Sec-

tion 482-Allocation of Income and Deductions Between Related Persons
-Up
To Date, N.Y.U. 22ND INST. ON FED. TAx. 381, 384-85 (1964);
Hewitt, Section 482-Allocation of Income and Control Among Related
Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 463, 472-73 (1962); Plumb &
Kapp, supra note 51, at 812. See also Comment, 13 WM. & MARnY L. Rv.
948 (1972).
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had rejected the introduction of what it termed a "common objective test" into this area. In ruling that two entities can constitute the "same interests" in regard to one operation, even
though they are otherwise in competition, the Second Circuit
accepted that test. This acceptance of a "common objective test"
could result in an expansion of Section 482. The really critical
question may now be whether parties which individually own or
control entities not dealing at arm's length constitute the same
interests. If such parties are treated as constituting the same
interests, inquiries as to inferred ownership or control will be
less frequent (and theoretically irrelevant), since the parties together will clearly hold the requisite ownership or control of the
entities. 69 A common objective may also be simpler to ascertain and less artificial than inferred controL Thus where several unrelated corporations70 each hold a minor interest in two
cost subsidiaries, 71 it may be relatively easy to show a common
business objective of lower production expenses so that Section
482 would be applicable.
The possibilities for extension of Section 482 are even
greater, however, if a tax avoidance purpose is alone deemed
an adequate common objective. For example: corporation A
makes a bargain sale of goods to corporation B which results in
greater current profits than B would otherwise have realized,
but which B can use advantageously because of a net operating
loss carryover. The combined taxes are accordingly less than
they would have paid had the sale been at arm's length, and B
"splits" his tax saving with A by a subsequent contribution to A's
capital. If A and B are owned by only marginally affiliated parties, it would be extremely difficult to infer common ownership
or control under the old tests. However, under a liberal application of the "common objective test," these parties would be
deemed the "same interests," common ownership would therefore exist, and the Commissioner could allocate accordingly.
69. Note, however, that the Second Circuit couched its Fornan
opinion in "control" language, even though the two parent corporations
together held complete ownership of their subsidiary. The court may
have erroneously equated ownership with control, as the earlier cases

had done in another context.
70. The common objective test should logically be applicable regardless of the number of parties involved.
71. These are subsidiaries occasionally formed by competing corporations to supply the parents with materials or services at a price
below what they would have cost had each parent purchased them separately.
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C.

ALLOCATION OR CREATION OF INCOME?
Section 482 grants the Commissioner power, in the appropriate situation, to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits or allowances. ' 72 Thus, income actually
earned by one member of a controlled group but artificially diverted to another member may be allocated by the Commissioner
to the member which earned it. This artificial diversion of income typically occurs when one member realizes gross income
from the use of proceeds loaned interest free or the resale of
goods transferred at a bargain price from another member. In
such situations, application of Section 482 is warranted, and the
73
Commissioner will prevail.
Where, however, the entity benefitted realizes no income
from the transaction, the issue arises whether the statutory language authorizes what appears to be the "creation" of income
for purposes of an allocation to the other party to the transaction. There are three interpretations of the scope of the Comissioner's authority to allocate in such a situation, which can
be illustrated by the following example: A and B are members
of a controlled group, and A sells goods to B at less than an
arm's length price. The "transactional" approach would require
that B realize current income from the resale of those particular
goods before an allocation could be made. The "overall" approach would allow an allocation if B realized current income
from any source whatever. The Commissioner's position, expressed in the regulations, 74 is that an allocation could be made
whether or not B realizes income from this particular transac75
tion or any other source.
1. Background
The first case to deal with this issue was Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner,76 where the Sixth Circuit re72.

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 482 (emphasis added).

73.

See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct.

Cl. 1967).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) (4) (1968).

75. For an alternative analysis of this issue under somewhat different theories, see Nauheim, B. Forman & Co., Inc.-A Crucial Test of
the Future of Section 482, 26 TAX LAWYER 107, 112 (1972).
76. 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940). In that case, one of two commonly
controlled corporations leased equipment to the other for $1,000 per
month. This second corporation operated at a loss the first year and
paid no rent. The two corporations then agreed that none would be
charged for the second year. Although the second corporation had
gross receipts of $51,427 this second year, it is not clear from the
facts whether it had gross income. The Commissioner did not allocate
either gross receipts or gross income from the lessee corporation but
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jected an allocation under the predecessor to Section 482, stating
that it
did not authorize the Commissioner to set up income where
none existed. The principal purpose of the section was to
clearly reflect income that did exist.7"
In the line of cases following this decision, the Tax Court appeared to be developing a transactional approach.78 It was uncertain from the earlier cases, however, whether the allocations
were rejected solely on the principle that income could not be
created or also on the ground that the Commissioner had failed
to make a correlative offsetting adjustment to the income or deductions of the entity from which the allocation was made. 79
The Service sought to use the latter ground as a basis for explaining the adverse decisions and rationalizing its acquiescence
to one of them"0 when it issued new regulations covering the
merely added $12,000 to the lessor corporation's income for the latter
year.
In the earlier case of Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79
F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1935), affg 31 B.T.A. 1152, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645
(1935), the court stated in dictum: "The Commissioner is authorized
to allocate gross income among trades or businesses under the specified statutory conditions. If there is no gross income there is nothing
to allocate." 79 F.2d at 237. Under the facts, however, there was
clearly income involved to support the Commissioner's allocation.
77. 112 F.2d at 510.
78. E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), acquiesced in 1941-1 Cum.
Bun. 7; Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acquiesced in 1951-1
Cuvt. BuLL. 3; Texsun Supply Corp., 17 T.C. 433 (1951), acquiesced in
1952-1 Cu-A. BuLL. 4. For a more detailed discussion of each case and
the development of this line of judicial thought, see Asbill, The Application of Section 482 to Domestic Taxpayers--Current Status and
Trends, 1967 So. CALIF. TAX INsT., 673, at 690-96; and Seieroe & Gerber,
Section 482--Still Growing at the Age of 50, 46 TAXES 893, at 902-04
(1967). See generally Jenks, The "Creation of Income" Doctrine: A
Comment on the Proposed Section 482 Regulations, 43 TAXES 486 (1965).
79. For example, in Smith-Bridgman, after holding that Section 45
did not authorize the creation of income, the Tax Court continued:
That the respondent did not "allocate" gross income of Continental to petitioner is apparent, since the record shows that
he made no adjustment to the income or deductions of Continental. He argues that no such adjustment was required,
since Continental in its taxable year ending January 31, 1944
had no net income. Such argument overlooks the established
fact that Continental in the taxable year 1945 did have net
income against which it could have applied the additional net
operating loss carry-over. While we do not have the tax liability of Continental before us we think that the respondent
has created rather than allocated gross income.
16 T.C. at 294. Thus, it appears that the Tax Court was taking the position that no proper allocation was made, because no reduction had
been made in the income of Continental, from whom the income was
allegedly being allocated.
80. Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acquiesced in 1951-1
Cum. BuLL. 3.
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subject. 8 ' While several commentators apparently accepted8 2the
Commissioner's rationale for distinguishing the prior cases, it
was not clear whether the courts would also accept it.
2.

JudicialReaction to The New Regulations

When promulgated in 1968, the new regulations8 3 on the
creation of income issue were in opposition to both the transactional and overall approaches.8 4 Treas. Reg. Section 1.482-1(d)
(4) states that an allocation may be made even though (1) the
transaction giving rise to the allocation produced no current income, (2) gross income may never be realized from that transaction and (3) the entity from which the allocation is made has no
gross income from any source.85
The next case to consider the creation of income issue, PPG
Industries, Inc.86 was being tried when the new regulations went
into effect. There, a wholly owned Brazilian holding company
81.

Regulations were proposed in 1965 but were superseded by

new proposed Regulations on August 2, 1966. These regulations were
ostensibly proposed to supplement and amplify the arm's length standard in the areas of loans or advances, performance of services, use of
tangible property, transfer or use of intangible property, and sales of
tangible property between controlled entities. The final regulations
were promulgated April 16, 1968 T.D. 6952, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 218.
The Commissioner's position was stated in T.I.R. 838 (Aug. 2, 1966).
This was followed by Rev. Rul. 67-79, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 117, wherein
it was explained:
The acquiescence in Smith-Bridgman & Co. was intended
only to concur in the proposition that appropriate adjustments
are to be made to the incomes of both members of the group
affected to reflect the allocation. The acquiescence does not
override the Service's position as to the scope and purpose of
section 482 . . . as set forth in existing regulations. Similarly,
the Service concurs in the result reached in Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. only to the extent the holding is based on its
failure to have made an appropriate adjustment to the income
or deductions to the members of the group from which the
allocation was made.
82. See Eustice, Tax Problems Arising from Transactions Between
Affiliated or Related Corporations, 23 TAx LAw Rsv. 451, at 489-90
(1968); Plumb & Kapp, supra note 51, at 814-15. This was not universally true, though, and some commentators warned against reliance on
the alleged distinction. See Seieroe & Gerber, supra note 78, at 903-04.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (d) (2) & (4) (1968).
84. It appears, in fact, that the two examples given in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-1 (d) (4) (1968) are specifically contrary in result to the decisions
in Texsun Supply Co. and Smith-Bridgman & Co.
85. In accordance with the Commissioner's present position, Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-1 (d) (2) (1968) now requires that a correlative adjustment
must be made to the income of the entity from which income is allocated.
86. 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
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(Pittsburco) had owed PPG $546,086 since 1940 as a result of interest-free advances made by PPG prior to and including that
date. Pittsburco first realized income in 1960 from dividends, interest, and gains from the sale of bonds. The Commissioner allocated interest income to PPG on the ground that a portion of
Pittsburco's 1960 investment income was attributable to PPG's
earlier advances. This time a correlative adjustment was made
in Pittsburco's income.
The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's technical distinction of prior cases and reiterated the proposition that there
can be no allocation where the commonly controlled businesses
realized no income as a result of the particular transaction.8 7
It concluded:
We cannot possibly conceive even the most tenuous connection between this 1940 balance and Pittsburco's income some
20 years later .... 88
While PPGwas definitely another taxpayer victory, the Tax
Court's opinion left some uncertainty as to its prospective impact. Notably, the court did not try to reconcile its decision

with the new regulation on creation of income. 89 The "tenuous
connection" language indicated that the court would continue to
follow a transactional approach in such matters, and that any
sustainable allocation would have to be based on a realistic nexus
between the intercompany transaction and the income-producing
event. In finding no such link in PPG the court was primarily
concerned with the time element, although this would not seem
to be relevant under the rationale of the transactional approach,
which theoretically places no limit on the time that may elapse
between the bargain transaction and the income realizing event.
It is possible that the court was putting the burden on the Commissioner to show some evidence of a nexus and relied on the
lengthy time between the initial transaction and the income87. 55 T.C. at 1010.

88. Id. at 1009.

89. There was no indication that the Regulations could not be

retroactively applied. See INT. ,REV. CODE of 1954, § 7805. In fact, the
court discussed those portions of the new regulations dealing with the
appropriate arm's length interest rate, which were cited on brief by
the Commissioner. It specifically declined to rule on whether the
Commissioner could ever make an allocation which was in effect an
imputation of interest, and nowhere did it deal with the regulation authorizing such an allocation even in the absence of gross income. The
court stated that it did not believe Section 482 and the regulations
thereunder were to be applied in so broad a manner, but it is not entirely clear which regulations were covered by this statement. 55 T.C.
at 1010.
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producing event to infer the absence of such a nexus. It was
not clear, however, whether the same inference would be drawn
if the interval were shorter.90 The question also remained as to
what factors were necessary to find a nexus sufficient to sustain
an allocation.
The Tax Court reaffirmed its position in Huber Homes, Inc.9 t
Charles Huber formed Huber Homes to build and sell family
dwellings. A wholly owned subsidiary (Huber Investment) was
later created to invest in and rent real estate, and Homes transferred 52 unsold houses to it at cost. Investment then rented
the houses to unrelated parties, reporting a gross rental income
of $470,181 but a net operating loss of $56,518 for the year in
question. The Commissioner allocated the difference between
the fair market value and the sales price of the houses to Homes
and proposed a correlative increase to the basis of the houses in
Investment's hands.
The Tax Court held that Section 482 was inapplicable, because the Commissioner was not allocating but creating income. "
The court reasoned that the Commissioner could not have
charged the difference between fair market value and cost as income to Homes if it had itself rented the houses, and Section 482
should not produce a different result merely because Investment
rented them. The court apparently felt that only an activity
similar in form to the bargain transaction-here a sale-could
generate allocable income. It then suggested, rather inconsistently, that an allocation to a bargain seller might be upheld
where the "use or consumption" of the goods produced income
without resale, but it did not provide an example and merely
stated that Huber Homes was not one. Again, the court avoided
the specific question of the regulations' validity, rationalizing
that they were not designed to cover a situation where there was
no intention to resell bargain goods outside the group.9 3
90. See Crawford, Are the Courts Expanding the Use of Code

Section 482?, 36 J. TAXATIoN 150, 152-53 (1972).
91. 55 T.C. 598 (1971).

92. The Commissioner's attempt, as in PPG, to distinguish earlier
cases on the ground that an appropriate correlative adjustment was
made here was expressly rejected. The court stated that the absence of
a correlative adjustment was "no more than a possible supporting
ground" and not a "controlling reason" for earlier decisions. Id. at 610.
93. The court rationalized that:
They plainly contemplate a situation where one member of
a controlled group sells to another at less than fair market value
and where it is expected that the controlled party would in
turn resell the product to a third party....
We think that
the regulations do not cover the present case where there was
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In reaching its decision, the Tax Court again appeared to be
relying on the transactional approach, but its opinion was confusing and still left uncertainty as to its exact position. The
court did not foreclose the possibility that an allocation would
be sustained, even in the absence of current gross income, if
there were an intent at the time of the transfer to subsequently
resell bargain goods outside the controlled group. It was unclear, however, whether the court was using this merely as a
means to distinguish the regulations or was proposing a new test.
Allowing such intent alone to support an allocation without
current income would seem to be a deviation from the strict
transactional approach, although the Tax Court could possibly
still claim adherence to it, since an intent to complete the particular transaction would be required. In some cases, however,
this would mean that the existence of a nexus between a current item of income and the initial transaction, which the PPG
decision found detrminative under the transactional approach,
would not be necessary.
In addition, some of the wording of the court's opinion
would seem to preclude an allocation where "mixed" transactions are involved. That is, if goods are obtained in a bargain
sale, only a subsequent resale, and not a rental, could be considered as generating income from the initial transaction. Similarly, loaned funds would have to be reloaned rather than invested in other income-producing activities. The unreasonableness of such a position is obvious when viewed in conjunction
with the court's statements concerning intent. Carried to an
extreme, this would permit the court to reject an allocation even
where it found that there was an initial intent to resell goods
received in a bargain sale, but where they were subsequently
no intention to resell the 52 houses in issue, where they were
converted to rental use, and where they do not appear to be
productive of any net income whatever.
Id. at 610. The court apparently derived this interpretation from the
"ultimate income anticipated" and "gross income contemplated" language in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (d) (4) (1962). In light of the Service's
position and the complete absence of any prior reference to taxpayer
intent by either the Commissioner or the courts, such a reading is questionable. Even accepting the court's interpretation, its apparent distinction between rental and resale income seems unfounded. The general
principle that there must be gross income to sustain an allocation
should equally limit the Commissioner's power in such a situation, intent to resell later notwithstanding. This distinction seemingly also
led the court to interject the term "net income" throughout its opinion,
whereas previous decisions had spoken only in terms of gross income.
This is apparently just dictum. See Crawford, supra note 90, at 151-52.
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rented instead. The court's position thus appears to be internally inconsistent, and its limitation on the use of-or on the
intent to use-bargain items is without apparent justification.
Huber Homes did little to clarify the Tax Court's transactional approach to the creation of income issue. This may have
been due to the court's attempt to apply previously developed
arguments to a peculiar fact situation before the court for the
first time. Ironically, while the result was a uniquely restrictive
application of the transactional approach, the court's opinion
left open the possibility of a liberal modification of its strict
transactional position.
The uncertainty in this area increased when the Commissioner was finally awarded a victory in B. Forman Co. v. Com9 4
missioner,
the first case to explicitly give solid support to the
regulations.9" The Commissioner in that case allocated income
to two corporations which made interest-free loans to their joint
subsidiary. The Second Circuit upheld the allocation, accepting
the Commissioner's contention that an allocation can be made
even in the absence of gross income if the proper correlative adjustments are made to the incomes and deductions of the respective entities. 96 The opinion placed primary reliance on the determination that the Commissioner's power in this area had been
significantly expanded by the Revenue Act of 1928, 97 which empowered him to distribute, apportion, or allocate income where
he previously could only require corporations to consolidate their
returns.9 8
94.

453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).

See

text following note 62 supra for the facts of this case.
95. The court stated that the regulations "must prevail, for they
are entirely consistent with the scope and purpose of § 482."
at 1156.

453 F.2d

96. The court dismissed the line of previous cases to the contrary
as "not in accord with either economic reality or with the declared purpose of Section 482," and stated that "[t]hey seriously impair [itsl
usefulness. . . ." 453 F.2d at 1156.
97. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 806.
98. The authority to consolidate accounts was the extent of the
Commissioner's power under the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 240(f),
44 Stat. 46. Moreover, the taxpayers themelves could opt for such
treatment if tax benefits would result. The Act of 1928, on the other
hand, gave the Commissioner power to effect tax results other than a
mere "wash-out" of intra-group transactions. It also extended this
power to entities which would not have come under the consolidated
returns provision and eliminated any taxpayer choice in the matter of
its utilization. For a comparison of some tax results under the consolidated return provisions and Section 482, see Farber, Intercompany
Accounting Among Related Companies: Relationship Between Section
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Due to the short shrift given the taxpayers' argument, it is
not entirely clear why the Second Circuit decided to break with
precedent and place itself in opposition to the Tax Court and
the Sixth Circuit. It was without direct support for its in toto
acceptance of the Commissioner's position, 0 and it can only be
conjectured that the court found his approach the most effective
implementation of the underlying policy of Section 482.100
3.

Modification in the Tax Court'sApproach

In spite of the Forman victory in the Second Circuit, the
Commissioner could reasonably have expected continued stiff
opposition in both the Tax Court and other circuits.' 0 ' Two recent decisions indicate, though, that while the Second Circuit
may remain alone in unqualifiedly accepting the Commissioner's
position, the Tax Court may have slightly shifted its own position.
In Kahler Corp.,10 2 non-interest bearing loans were made by
Kabler to its subsidiaries, which used the funds for working capital during an expansion period. The Commissioner allocated
interest income to Kahler solely on the ground that the loans
were not made at arm's length and without regard to the ultimate use of the interest-free funds or whether they produced income. The Tax Court summarily denied the allocation, despite
its finding that the funds advanced were "unquestionably" used
482 and Consolidated Returns Provisions, N.Y.U. 27r
TAx. 719 (1968).

INST.

oN

FED.

99. The court cited for support National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 699 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943), and the
report of the House Ways and Means Committee accompanying the
statutory changes in the Act of 1928. H.R. RaP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16-17 (1928). However, the National Securities case was not on
point, and the House Committee report dealt only with the general
scope and purpose of the statute. Neither specifically touched on the
creation of income issue, although the committee report does offer indirect support for the court's position. See Nauheim, supra note 75, at
116-117.
100. The committee report on the 1928 Act states that Section 45
(482's predecessor) was enacted "in order to prevent evasion (by the
shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales and other methods
frequently adopted for the purpose of 'milking'), and in order to clearly
reflect [the controlled entities'] true tax liability." H.R RaP. No. 2,
supra note 99.
101. In fact, this may have been one reason the Commissioner did
not appeal Huber Homes. The reviewing court would have been the
Sixth Circuit, which decided the Tennessee-Arkansas case.
102. 58 T.C. 496 (1972). The Commissioner has announced nonacquiescence, and both the taxpayer and the Commissioner will appeal
the decision to the Ninth Circuit
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for productive purposes. The Commissioner, it explained, was
framing the issue improperly in making an allocation merely on
the basis that income would have been realized in arm's length
bargaining, rather than asserting that income actually was generated by the funds and improperly deflected.' °3' The court rejected Forman as incorrectly delineating both the purpose of
Section 482 and the circumstances required for it to operate and
declared that the regulations reached beyond the intent and purpose of the Section.
Considered alone, Kahler would appear to have firmly solidified the Tax Court's transactional approach. But the companion case to KahIer indicates that a shift has occurred. Kerry
Investment Co.' 0 4 involved the allocation of interest income on
similar unpaid interest-free loans made by a Seattle holding
company to its subsidiary. The subsidiary profitably invested
some of the proceeds in real estate ventures and reloaned some
to an outsider, but various other portions were invested in nonincome producing stock. The remaining funds could not be
traced to any specific assets by either the taxpayer or the Commissioner.
The Tax Court allowed the allocation with respect to those
funds which were traced to the real estate ventures and the loan.
Not surprisingly, it held that no allocation could be made in regard to loan proceeds traceable to non-income producing stock,
citing its decision in Huber Homes. But when the question of
the non-traceable assets arose, the court again sustained the
Commissioner's allocation. Rejecting the claim that this was
creating rather than allocating income, the court rationalized its
decision in terms of the taxpayer's burden of proof. Since the
burden was on the taxpayer to prove that the Commissioner's
allocation was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, 0 5 it was
incumbent upon him to show that these non-traceable funds did
not result in the production of gross income. In the absence of
such a showing, the court concluded, the Commissioner's determination must stand. The court found this result to be desirable, since it placed the burden of keeping complete and accurate
records on the taxpayer himself, who would naturally have best
103. The court restated its position that a prerequisite to a Section
482 allocation "is the existence of an item of income, deduction, credit
or allowance which had its genesis in the particular transaction between the related parties." Id. at 506.
104. 58 T.C. 479 (1972). This decision will be appealed with Kahler,
see text accompanying note 102 supra.
105. See note 5 supra.
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access to the necessary information, rather than the Commissioner.
In both Kahler and Kerry, the court affirmed its position
that the Commissioner cannot utilize Section 482 to "create" in-

come solely by imposing an arm's length test to intragroup transactions.

Thus the Commissioner's allocation was rejected in

Kahler on what was apparently only a procedural technicalityhis failure to assert that gross income was generated as a result

of the particular transaction. Viewed together, the Kailer and
Kerry decisions mark a modification in the Tax Court's transactional approach but also indicate that the court is not ready to
adopt a major change in its position.
The modification is in the emphasis on the taxpayer's burden of proof. In both PPG Industries and Huber Homes, the
court had refused to sustain an allocation, because it could find
no connection between the bargain transaction and the current
gross income realized by the subsidiary. While not rejecting
the general rule that the taxpayer must prove the Commissioner's action arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the courts required little of the taxpayer to sustain his burden if the Commissioner could not show such a connection. Impliedly, the onus
was on the Commissioner to establish the connection, rather than
on the taxpayer to prove its absence.
The tracing concept adopted in Kerry is a retreat from this,
since it requires a higher standard of proof of the taxpayer and
explicitly requires him to show that no income was realized as a
result of the bargain transaction. It is now incumbent upon the
taxpayer to negate the existence of a connection, rather than
upon the Commissioner to establish it. This can be done only by
tracing the bargain transaction to non-income producing assets
or activities.
The court also seems to have eliminated some of the uncertainties raised in Huber Homes. There, the court refused an allocation of rental income to the bargain seller of the houses
rented, indicating that income generated by an activity dissimilar to the bargain transaction would not be allocable under the
transactional approach. Yet, in Kerry allocations were upheld,
not only where loaned funds were reloaned, but also where they
were invested in other forms of income-producing activities.
Thus, the "mixed transaction" restriction appears to have been
disapproved. Kerry also settled in the affirmative the issue left
open in Huber: whether income generated from the use or con-
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sumption of bargain items could be allocated under the transactional approach.
4.

General Analysis and Criticisms of the Tax Court's Current
Position

The Tax Court's slight modification in the taxpayer's burden of proof, as evidenced by Kerry and Kahler, presents the distinct possibility that it may eventually adopt an overall approach
that allows an allocation of current gross income realized from
any source whatsoever. The court will now sustain an allocation
of income generated by the use or consumption of bargain items
unless the taxpayer can prove the absence of a nexus between
such income and the bargain transaction. In some situations
the taxpayer's tracing burden will be almost impossible to carry,
such as where interest-free funds are contributed to working
capital and consumed by operating costs. The court theoretically could still deal with this situation under its modified transactional approach. However, the effect of allowing an allocation
where some income is generated and the taxpayer cannot trace
the funds to specific non-income producing assets or activities
is very similar to the result which would be reached under the
overall approach. 10 0 Significantly, such an outcome is presaged
in the Kahler case, where the Tax Court indicated it would
have upheld an allocation on facts similar to those above if the
Commissioner had alleged that the income was generated by the
use or consumption of the bargain items rather than relying
merely on the existence of a bargain transaction. 10
The Tax Court's adoption of an overall approach would be
welcome. Any bargain transaction between controlled entities
will benefit the recipient economically. The rent-free use of
buildings, for example, will reduce operating expenses and increase gross income. Or, as the dissent pointed out in Kerry
and Kahler, the proceeds of an interest-free loan, though not
themselves used to produce income, may free other funds which
do. A subsidiary may purchase real estate which is not currently productive but is necessary for its future operations. If
it has received interest-free funds from its parent, it will be able
to make the purchase without diverting funds from its working
capital as would otherwise be required. Since it can therefore
106. See text following note 73 supra.
107. One dissenting judge would have gone even further, following
the Fornan decision, and allowed an allocation without current gross
income. Kerry Inv. Co., 58 T.C. 479, 494 (1972).
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maintain its current level of productivity, it need not incur a reduction in current income. Although ostensibly there has been
no increase in the subsidiary's income per se, in reality its income would have been less had there been no bargain transaction. The parent, on the other hand, will lose the interest income it would have received had it loaned the funds at an arm's
length rate. Thus, as with the conventional bargain transaction
-e.g., bargain sale and resale by the benefited entity-one entity's income has been increased and the other's decreased.
Since this is true of all bargain transactions where the tracing is
to nonproductive uses, allocations should be utilized in such situations to accurately reflect true taxable income.
The overall approach is preferable to the Commissioner's
position that an allocation should be allowed regardless of
whether the recipient of bargain items realizes any gross income. Both approaches would eliminate the need for any tracing of funds or materials and would better reflect the economic
realities of bargain transactions than the transactional approach.
The overall approach, however, only permits an allocation when
some item of current gross income is realized,10 8 and this would
allow the Tax Court to adhere to the apparent statutory requirement that some gross income be in existence for an allocation to
be appropriate. On the other hand, the Commissioner's approach
could lead to inequitable results since it seemingly ignores the
statute's purpose-to insure that income is properly reflected. For
example, where prior to its liquidation an insolvent subsidiary receives only enough interest-free loans from its parent to satisfy its
creditors, the overall approach would not permit an allocation of
interest income to the parent. The Commissioner's approach,
however, would permit an allocation even though the subsidiary
108. This should be subject to the further limitation, heretofore assumed, that the realized income is equal to or greater than the allocated amount. Thus, where the benefited entity realizes only $1000
of gross income in the year of the bargain transaction, no more than
$1000 should be allocated. Otherwise, the realization of only a minimal
amount of gross income could technically support a complete allocation
in the current year, and there would be little justification for distinguishing the overall approach from the Commissioner's approach.
If the benefited entity does not realize current gross income equal
to the arm's length amount, then income earned in successive years
should logically trigger further allocations pro tanto until the total
aim's length charge has been allocated. Theoretically, this method comports with both the purpose and language of Section 482, but it may
present substantial practical problems, especially in regard to record
keeping, where the individual allocations must be made over several
years.
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generated no current income and, in fact, would never generate
income. Such a result distorts the statutory purpose of clearly
reflecting income.' 0 9
III.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 482 TO OTHER
CODE SECTIONS AND TAX PRINCIPLES

There are a number of situations similar to those previously
discussed which the Commissioner has approached through Section 482 but which are more properly analyzed under other Code
sections or judicially established tax principles. The converse
has also occurred: the Commissioner has invoked judicial principles or multiple Code sections in addition to section 482 in situations which could have been remedied through application of
Section 482 alone. The above practices have tended to obscure
the fact that each section has its own appropriate scope and impact in the tax law. When accepted by the courts, this practice
can lead to either an undesirably broad or unnecessarily restrictive application of Section 482 and creates instability and uncertainty in the tax law. Consequently, one of the major problems,
in recent years especially, has been delineating the boundaries
within which Section 482 should operate.
An example of the latter situation is Rubin v. Commission1 0
er,"
where the Second Circuit warned against the Commissioner's practice of using multiple Code sections unnecessarily
and rejected this tactic in a situation which it felt clearly called
for the application of Section 482 alone. That case involved management fees paid to a close corporation for the personal services
of its controlling shareholder. The Commissioner attempted to
tax the corporation's income directly to the shareholder, initially
advancing arguments under both Section 482 and Section 61.11,
109. For the reasons given, it has been suggested that if there is
any justification for implementing the Commissioner's approach, that
result should be achieved through legislation rather than administrative
expansion of the Code. Lewis, Tax Court in Huber Homes holds that the
IRS may not use 482 to create income, 34 J. TAXATION 208 (1971); Com-

ment, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 509, 519 (1967).
110.

429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970).

See text accompanying notes 28-35

supra.
111. The Commissioner may have been led to believe that this was
the proper approach by the decision in George Cukor, 27 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 89 (1968). There, a motion picture director's wholly owned corporation sold his services at a profit. To avoid personal holding company tax, this corporation paid a dividend to its newly created subsidiary. The Commissioner claimed that this was a sham transaction and
tried to tax the dividend to the individual. Although the Tax Court
upheld the taxpayer's arrangement, it strongly indicated that the Com-
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The Tax. Court upheld the allocation under assignment of income and "substance over form" principles without even reaching the Section 482 issue. It held that Rubin, rather than his
corporation, was the "true earner" of the management fees, and
"in substance" he worked directly for the other corporation.
Reversing and remanding, the Second Circuit held that the
Tax Court had erroneously neglected Section 482. It admonished that:
Resort to "common law" doctrines of taxation and the broad
sweep of § 61 may occasionally be useful in connection with
"transactions heavily freighted with tax motives" which cannot
be satisfactorily handled in other ways .

.

. but they have no

place where, as here, there is a statutory provision adequate to
deal with the problem presented.1 2
The court found that Section 482 was the appropriate statutory
provision and clearly superior to the "blunt tool" employed by
the Tax Court.113 It apparently felt that once Section 61 is applied to a case in a particular area, there is the danger that this
will unintentionally "open" the area to the broad judicial concepts associated with that section, whether appropriate or not.
Despite the admonitions of the Second Circuit, there appears to be no move to effectively delineate the precise scope of
Section 482 in relation to other Code sections and tax principles.
Instead, recent cases indicate that the use of "blunt tools" will
continue.
A.

INCURSIONS OF SECTION 482 INTO INAPPROPRIATE AREAS

The confusion which can result from application of Section
482 where another Code section should have been used is illus5
trated in Marcs Big Boy-Prospect, Inc." 4 and Your Host, Inc."
In Marc's Big Boy, a corporation, Wisconsin Big Boy (WBB),
obtained a restaurant franchise for Wisconsin. It then established wholly owned subsidiary restaurants for the purpose of
setting up each under a subfranchise agreement. WBB did not
actually operate the individual restaurants but supervised their
operation and performed services for them for a fee. The Commissioner would have been successful if he had allocated the income
itself directly to the individual under Section 61 assignment-of-income
principles.
112. 429 F.2d at 653.
113. Id.

114. 52 T.C. 1073 (1969), aff'd. sub. nom., Wisconsin Big Boy Corp.

v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971).
115. 58 T.C. 10 (1972). This decision is on appeal to the Second
Circuit by both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.
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missioner proceeded against WBB on three grounds. He gave
notice under Section 61 that the corporate entities of the subsidiaries were to be disregarded for tax purposes and all their income and deductions attributed to WBB. He also allocated all
income and deductions to WBB under Section 482. Finally, the
Commissioner disallowed the subsidiaries' surtax exemptions
under Sections 269 and 1551 on the ground that the enjoyment
of multiple exemptions was the major purpose for operating
through multiple corporations.' 1c
The Tax Court purported to dispose of the case on Section
482 grounds. The Commissioner, however, had not based his
allocations on any particular non-arm's length transactions and
only "suggested" that certain transactions failed to satisfy the
arm's length standard. 117 At trial, the real issue became
whether the subsidiaries were formed and operated as separate
taxable entities." 8 The court expressly found that the subsidiary restaurants were not shams and that their corporate independence had not been disregarded. Nevertheless, it sustained
the Commissioner's 100 per cent allocation to WBB and held:
[T] he record sustains the Commissioner's determination that
WBB generated the income for the year in issue by conducting
an integrated business enterprise through its divisions set up
as wholly owned subsidiary corporations." 19
Thus the court seemed to conclude that a Section 482 allocation
could be based on the mere existence of this type of multiple
corporate structure, even without the showing of specific nonarm's length transactions. 20 That the apparent impact of this
116. Section 269 deals with acquisitions of corporate entities primarily to obtain the benefits of deductions, credits, or allowances not
otherwise available. Section 1551 deals with the creation of corporations
to obtain surtax exemptions and improper accumulations of surplus
credits.
117. 52 T.C. at 1094.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1104 (emphasis added). On appeal of Marc's Big BoyProspect, Inc., the Seventh Circuit also claimed to premise its decision
on Section 482, but again the organizational nature of the business was
the crucial factor. It reasoned that the segments of the business were
so interdependent that it was doubtful whether unrelated entities dealing at arm's length would have arrived at a comparable division of
functions. It therefore upheld the complete allocation even though the
Commissioner did not attempt to reconstruct any of the intercorporate
transactions according to the arm's length standard. Wisconsin Big
Boy Corp. v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971).
120. Section 482's stated purpose of placing controlled taxpayers on
a tax parity with uncontrolled taxpayers logically presupposes the recognition of separate tax entities. See, e.g., Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 334 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 835
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result was not lost on the Commissioner was exhibited by his
reaction, shortly thereafter, to a similar situation.
In Your Host, Inc., one corporation initially operated a series
of restaurants, and additional restaurants were subsequently established through ten new corporations. Also incorporated were
a central commissary, a holding company to own and operate
the real estate on which the restaurants and commissary were
located, a bakery, and a vending machine company. As in Marc's
Big Boy, the Commissioner utilized Section 482 to allocate all of
the income and deductions of the ten other restaurant corporations and the vending machine company to the original corporation.

This time, however, the Tax Court ruled that he had abused
his discretion and sustained only part of the allocations. It held
that the other ten restaurant corporations were viable economic
entities which earned their own income and that Your Host provided no service or benefit to them without adequate compensation and thus a complete allocation was therefore unwarranted, regardless of the motives for using multiple corporations.
Section 482, it stated, was not designed to deal with any prohib(1952). On this basis, the early decisions rejected the Commissioner's
attempts to base an allocation of net income solely on the existence of a
highly integrated multicorporate enterprise. See, e.g., Chelsea Products, Inc., 16 T.C. 840 (1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); accord,
T.V-D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957).
Such allocations were later allowed where the separate entities of a
"highly integrated" business served no business functions of any consequence. In these cases, the personnel of the corporation to which income was allocated in fact produced the income, and the corporate
shell from which the income was allocated was really a sham. Hamburgers York Road, 41 T.C. 821 (1964); see Charles Town, Inc. v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1967); J. R. Land Co. v. United States,
361 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1966); Spicer Theater, Inc., 44 T.C. 198 (1964), afl'd,
346 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1965). On the other hand, a complete allocation of
net income among the entities of a multicorporate enterprise was considered improper where there was a valid business purpose for the
existence of the separate businesses. W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner,
396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968); see Phillip Bros. Chemicals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970).
In the present case, however the Tax Court seemed to conclude that
WBB generated the entire net income of the enterprise merely because
it exercised extensive control over its subsidiaries. For the first time,
the court thereby made the existence of an integrated enterprise itself
a determinative factor in a Section 482 allocation. For a more detailed discussion of the background to, and a criticism of, the Marc's
Big Boy decision, see Lee, Section 482 and the IntegratedBusiness Enter-

prise, 57 V. L. REv. 1376 (1971).
The court also failed to discuss Sections 269 or 1551, even though
both are directly aimed at abuses in this type of situation. See text
accompanying notes 126-27 infra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:559

ited activities except the shifting of income among controlled
entities. 12 1 Apparently realizing that its own Marc's Big Boy
opinion had given a different impression, the court went to some
length to explain that case. It recognized that a large portion of
its earlier opinion was devoted to detailing the integration of the
entities as a single business enterprise. Nevertheless, the court
claimed that the allocation to WBB was not sustained because
of the organizational form of the enterprise but because there
was no proof that WBB and its subsidiaries dealt at arm's
length. "[W]e believed," it rationalized, "that it was clear that
we were not using section 482 to penalize the petitioners merely
for operating a single business through several corporations but
to reflect the fact that subsidiaries were being used to distort
the amount of income reported by WBB .. ,12.
It is difficult to see how the Tax Court could have expected
either taxpayers or the Commissioner to perceive this as the actual holding in Marc's Big Boy. The Tax Court itself stated that
the primary issue was the viability of the entities rather than the
existence of specific income distorting transactions, and the questions of non-arm's length dealing was considered only in regard
to the division of functions among the entitites. The definite
impression which had been given in Marc's Big Boy was that an
artificially divided enterprise would be especially vulnerable to
attack under Section 482, with the result being a complete allocation of the income and deductions of the artificially separated
23
entities to a single dominant member.1
If the Tax Court had admitted that Section 482 was in fact
being used this way in Marc's Big Boy, it would have also had
121.

Your Host, Inc., 58 T.C. 10, 23-24 (1969).

122.

Id. at 25.

The court then attempted to distinguish Marc's Big

Boy on the ground that each of the corporations in Your Host was a
viable entity, earning its own income and directly paying its own
expenses. The distinction is puzzling, however, since WBB's subsidiaries were also found to be separate viable entities. Moreover, the
court stated that the Your Host enterprise constituted as much a single
integrated business as did the enterprise in Marc's Big Boy.
123. The Commissioner conceded on appeal in Wisconsin Big Boy v.
Commissioner that the mere existence of an artificially divided enterprise does not call for automatic application of Section 482. He obviously felt, however, that his victory gave him broad powers in such situations. As the Tax Court later noted in Your Host, "The facts of this
case have many similarities to those of Marc's Big Boy-Prospect, Inc.,

... under which [the Commissioner] believes his allocations under
section 482 can be supported without question." Id. at 23. See also
Lee, CA-7"s Wisconsin Big Boy Case Has Dire Implications in 482 Area,
36 J. TAXATON 349, 350-51 (1972).
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to acknowledge the distorted application there of the arm's
length standard. The courts in Marc's Big Boy were using the
arm's length standard, not to test particular intercorporate dealings, but to judge the propriety of the multiple corporation form.
Having found that this was not the type of corporate structure
which would have been established by unrelated parties dealing
at arm's length, they seemed to assume that income was therefore
being distorted. If this were true, it would mean a completely
novel and unwarranted use of the arm's length test. The regulations distinctly contemplate use of this standard in regard to
individual transactions.'2 4 In addition, it is well settled that the
Commissioner may allocate, not because there is power to shift
income, but because there has been actual shifting of income or
deductions.125 Fortunately, the Tax Court sought to clarify its

position in Your Host.
As the court emphasized in its opinion there, Section 482 is
not intended to remedy all tax distortions effected through controlled multiple corporations. It specifically authorizes the Commissioner to unscramble a situation where controlled entitites
have artificially shifted income among themselves and allocate
to each entity the actual income earned by it. The motives for
using multiple entities are, in this case, irrelevant. On the other
hand, where several controlled corporations do deal with each
other at arm's length, but where tax avoidance motives for establishing or acquiring them predominates then it would be appropriate to disallow separate deductions, credits, or allowances
in general under Section 269 or to disallow separate surtax exemptions and accumulated earnings credits in particular under
Section 1551. In the extreme case where the corporations are
not operating as separate entities but are actually part of a single
entity, then Section 61 principles, such as "sham incorporation"
or "substance over form" can be invoked. 120 To confuse these
separate situations and indiscriminately apply one Code section
or tax principle where another should be utilized distorts the
purpose for which each was intended and merely adds uncertainty to the law and increases the chance of inconsistency in
situations which should yield similar results. 2 7 Thus a series of
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (d) (1) (1964).
125. See, e.g., Bush Hog Mfg. Co., 42 T.C. 713 (1964).
126. See Note, Allocation of Income Among Controlled TaxpayersSection 482 Rather than Section 61, 45 Ttm. L. REv. 635 (1971).
127. See Westphal, The Treatment of Income and Deductions in the
Case of Controlled or Related Entities, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1041
(1968).
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decisions in which the imprecise application of Section 482 is allowed could lead to results much more severe than the statute
was intended to impose. In Marc's Big Boy, for example, this
meant complete allocations of income and deductions simply on
the basis of corporate form and in the absence of sufficient nonarm's length transactions to otherwise support such allocations.' 28

B.

INAPPROPRIATE RESTRICTIONS ON SECTION

482

BY THE SUPREME

COURT

The Commissioner, as well as the taxpayer, can be hurt by
the failure to recognize the proper scope and purpose of Section
482, as illustrated in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Com2
missioner v. First Security Bank.'1
The taxpayers were two national banks controlled by a holding company which also controlled a management company and an insurance agency.
Beginning in 1948, the banks made credit life insurance
available to their borrowers using unrelated insurance companies.1 30 In 1954, the holding company incorporated its own subsidiary insurance company in anticipation of the enactment of
preferential tax rates for life insurance companies. In accordance with a plan proposed by an independent insurer, the banks
continued to offer credit life insurance as before but began

128. By accepting the invocation of Section 482 under a generation of
income theory, the Tax Court deprived the taxpayers of the "substantial
business" defense which would be available against a "sham" attack
under Section 61. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319
U.S. 436 (1943). Its failure to require the application of Sections 269
and 1551 also allowed the Commissioner to escape the limitations of
these sections.
129. 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
130. A standard procedure was followed in offering this insurance.
The bank's lending officer (not a licensed agent) would explain the function and availability of credit insurance to the borrower. If the borrower desired coverage, the form was completed, a certificate of insurance issued, and the premium collected or added to the loan. Completed forms and premiums were forwarded from the bank to Management Company which recorded the purchase and sent the premiums to the independent carrier. Management Company also processed claims filed under the policies. The cost of the services rendered
by the banks and Management Company was "negligible," about $2,000
a year.
The Tax Court determined that the reasons for providing the service included: (1) offering a service increasingly supplied by competing
financial institutions; (2) obtaining the benefit of additional collateral
which credit insurance provides by repaying the loan on the borrower's death or disability; and (3) providing an additional source of
income-part of the premiums. 405 U.S. at 396.

19731

SECTION 482

sending the premiums and policies directly to the independent
insurer which then reinsured the policies with the newly formed
insurance company. The banks were prohibited by federal banking law from receiving sales commissions from the insurer' 31
and, in fact, received none. The new insurance company, however, received 85 per cent of the premiums from the insurer for
assuming the risks on the policies. It reported the reinsurance
premiums as income at the preferential rates accorded to insurance companies. 1 32 Because of these special rates, the total
amount of tax paid by the holding company's controlled group
was less than it would have been if the banks had claimed or
received the commssions. 133 Acting under Section 61 and Section 482, the Commissioner allocated 40 per cent of the subsidiary insurance company's premium income to the banks as compensation for originating and processing the insurance.
The Tax Court upheld the allocation on the ground that
since the banks "generated the business," they were taxable on
an amount equal to the usual sales commission income.' 34 However, the Tenth Circuit reversed, 13 5 expressly rejecting the generation of business rationale. The acceptance of such a theory,
it claimed, would have "alarming consequences" on many normal business practices such as security commission give-ups and
all types of referral business. 36 On appeal the Supreme Court
did not focus on the generation of business issue. It decided the
case on the completely different ground that, since the banks
did not receive, and legally could not receive, sales commissions,
no part of the reinsurance premiums could be allocated to
37
them.1
131. 12 U.S.C. § 92 implicitly prohibits banks in places having a
population in excess of 5,000 inhabitants from acting as insurance
agents. Id. at 401.
132. Both the Life Insurance Company Tax Act for 1955, 70 Stat. 36,
and the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 112,
accorded preferential tax treatment to life insurance companies. Id. at
399 n.6.
133. Under the existing tax rates, assuming both the banks and
Management Company had income in excess of $25,000, without the
commissions, such an allocation would have had no effect on the total
taxes paid by Holding Company's subsidiaries. Id. at 397 n.2.
134. 26 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 1320 (1967). This reasoning had previously been approved, on similar facts, by the Seventh Circuit in Local
Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 773 (1967), affd, 407 F.2d 629
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969).
135. Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 436 F.2d 1192 (1971).
136. Id. at 1197.
137. In limiting its decision to the narrow illegality issue, the Court
failed to reach the broader issue of whether the mere generation of
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The Court, per Mr. Justice Powell, phrased its position in
terms of general tax principles. Relying on dicta from two earlier cases, it declared:
In cases dealing with the concept of income, it has been
assumed that the person to whom the income was attributed
could have received it. The underlying assumption always has
been that in order to be taxed for income, a taxpayer must have
complete dominion over it.138
Thus, in the present case, the Commissioner could only allocate
income if the holding company did in fact have "complete
power" to shift income and exercise it in such a way that the
true taxable income of a subsidiary was understated. Since the
holding company could not have shifted income among its subsidiaries without violating federal banking laws, the Court concluded that the necessary control over the income was lacking. 139 It then dismissed the Commissioner's arm's length argument, reasoning that even if these entities had not been related,
no commissions or premiums could have been legally received
and there would still have been no income. The result therefore actually did place these controlled taxpayers on a parity
with similarly situated uncontrolled taxpayers in accord with
Section 482's purpose.
Justices Marshall and Blackmun dissented, rejecting the majority's emphasis on the prohibition against the banks' actually
receiving the allocated income, and concluding that Section 482
was applicable. Mr. Justice Marshall contended that the relevant banking statute prohibited not just the receipt of insurance
sales commissions by the banks but also the activities which
generated this income. Since the banks admitted actively solicitbusiness justifies an allocation of income to the generator. The Court
did indicate, however, that it tended to agree with the Tenth Circuit's
position that the origination or referral of business does not "necessarily"
result in taxable income to the originator. 405 U.S. at 401 n.11. Its
equivocal support for this position and the fact that it was delivered by
way of dictum, though, failed to settle the matter, and some uncertainty
still exists.
138. 405 U.S. at 403. This concept that income implies dominion or
control, the Court found, is even recognized in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (b)
(1) (1962).
139. Those cases holding the proceeds of criminal activities to be
taxable, James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), and Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952), were distinguished on the grounds that
here (1) there was no actual receipt of income and (2) the act generating the income, the originating and referring of insurance, was itself
legal. This case, the Court stated, was more like L.D. Shunk Latex
Products, Inc. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 940 (1952), where the Tax Court
also rejected an allocation of income to an entity legally prohibited
from receiving it.
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ing the insurance, the legal violation was a fait accompli.' 40 The
controlled group as a whole, he noted, obviously had the right
to the proceeds, and the Commissioner was properly attempting
to ensure that they were equitably allocated. Mr. Justice Blackmun could find no authority for the majority's attempt to equate
the illegality of receipt of income with inability to tax it, which
he thought reminiscent of the short-lived claim of right doctrine.
Section 482, he maintained, surely contemplates taxation of income without its formal receipt, and it was therefore unimportant that the commissions did not actually flow through the
141
banks.
While the Court ostensibly decided the case under Section
482, its whole approach to the problem was influenced by Section 61 assignment of income and claim of right concepts. By
injecting such notions into its consideration of the case, the majority failed to give adequate weight to the fact that the entities
here were related members of a single group within which income was being generated and shifted to one member which received preferential tax treatment. It also lost sight of the fact
that Section 482 may be properly invoked even where income
shifting does not amount to tax evasion. In the First Security
Bank situation, allocation of the income to the bank, which actually performed the services, is clearly within the scope of
Section 482. It is significant that Congress, in enacting preferential treatment for life insurance companies, believed that Section
482 would be available to correct potential abuses in this area.142
140. 405 U.S. at 413. Mr. Justice Marshall found relevant those
cases holding that a taxpayer may be taxed on illegally earned income.
To distinguish those cases on the ground that the banks did not receive the commissions, while another member of the controlled group
did, would, he declared, "give undue weight to the absence of technical
temporary possession of money and some abstract concept of a 'right' to
receive it." Id. at 416.
141. Id. at 418. Justice Blackmun found several examples from
other areas of the tax law which demonstrated to him that taxability

without receipt is common and that there could indeed be taxation of

income without complete dominion over it. While it was true, he
noted, that no decision had extended taxation without receipt to a situation where the taxpayer was prohibited from receiving the income, it
was also true that no court had refrained from going that far. Id. at
424142. There is a potential abuse situation in the case of the socalled captive insurance companies. It may be possible for a
finance company, for example, to establish a subsidiarr life
insurance company that will issue life insurance policies in
connection with the business of the parent. If the subsidiary
charges excessive premium on this business, a portion of the
income of the parent company can be diverted to the life insurance company. It is believed that section 482 of the Internal
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As to the legal restriction on the receipt of income, it has already been recognized, at least impliedly, 143 that such restrictions are not determinative on Section 482 issues.
The effect of the decision in First Security Bank is to subject the Commissioner's power under Section 482 to judicial limitations developed under Section 61. This is unfortunate in two
respects. It not only renders the statute less efficacious in dealing with the problem of clearly reflecting the income of controlled entities but also demonstrates that, at least for the time
being, there will be no attempt to require the use of Section 482
in a more consistent and precise fashion. 1"4 As a result, the appropriate scope of Section 482 may be further clouded.

C. THE ROLE OF SECTION 482
Where the application of Section 482 is appropriate, there
are several reasons for requiring its utilization alone rather than
resorting to other Code sections and general judicial principles.
Section 482 allows more flexibility in dealing with the diverse
situations likely to arise in regard to controlled entities. For example, where there is no doubt as to the viability of the entities
involved, the court is not faced with an all-or-nothing choice as
is usually the case when Section 61 theories are invoked. Thus,
as both Ach and Borge illustrate, it can be used to allocate an apRevenue Code of 1954 (relating to allocation of income and deductions among related taxpayers) provides the Secretary of
the Treasury ample regulative authority to deal with this
problem.
H.R. REP. No. 1098, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1956); S. REP. No. 1571, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1956), cited in 405 U.S. at 524 n.14.
143. South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 366 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016
(1967).
There, a partnership and corporation were owned by four
families. Due to the distribution of ownership interests, the same group
of individuals controlled the partnership absolutely, but owned only 65
per cent of the corporation. The corporation rented facilities to the
partnership at a non-arms length rate, and the Commissioner allocated
income to the corporation. The taxpayers claimed that the requisite
common control by the same interests did not exist. Local law, they
argued, prohibited a corporation from leasing substantially all of its
assets without the approval of 80 per cent of its shareholders and here
the shareholder-partners only constituted 65 per cent of those shareholders. Nevertheless, the Tax Court upheld the allocation, finding "actual
control" for Section 482 purposes, in spite of the limitations of the
local law.
144. One commentator, however, has praised this decision as "a

taxpayer bill of rights with respect to overriding principles of taxpayer
disability and taxpayer volition," Teschner, First Security Bank of Utah
Taxpayer Disability and the Supreme Court, 50 TAxEs 260, 267 (1972).
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propriate portion of income from a corporation to its shareholder-employee to reflect his contribution in generating that
income. Similarly, where there is a series of non-arm's length
transactions among several controlled entities, corresponding allocations can be made to reflect the precise proportion of the
group's total income which was earned by each. In both situations, true taxable income can be allocated without even approaching the question of whether the corporations are valid
rather than mere shams. Moreover, specific relief provisions
are available to taxpayers to alleviate some of the unnecessarily harsh consequences which might otherwise result from
an allocation. For example, revenue procedures have been promulgated to obviate the possibility of double taxation where
foreign tax authorities refuse to give effect to an allocation of
income from a foreign to a domestic corporation. 1 45 In many
cases, the specific nature of an allocation is unclear, and the result is that courts frequently rationalize their decisions in overly
broad terminology, such as that characteristic of Section 61 concepts. 1 46 Requiring the use of Section 482 will compel the Commissioner to more precisely set forth the fact patterns upon
which he bases his attacks.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Recent developments in regard to Section 482 are indicative
of the uncertainty which still prevails in this area of taxation.
Viewed against the background of the Ach case, the decision in
Richard Rubin forewarns of the dangers of allocations to shareholder-employees of close corporations generally. The shifting
emphasis under the common ownership or control requirement
from the control inquiry to the issue of which parties may constitute the same interests may presage broadened application of
Section 482. The 1968 regulations are still in opposition to judicial authority on the creation of income issue, but the decisions
in B. Forman Company and Kerry Investment indicate that the
Second Circuit has decided to follow the Regulations and that
the Tax Court has modified its transactional approach to the
145. Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2 Cum. BuLL. 493; Rev. Proc. 65-17,
1965-1 Cum.. BuLL. 833; Rev. Proc. 65-54, 1964-2 CUm. BULL 1008. For
the operation of these, see Aland, Section 482: 1971 Version, 49 TAXES
815, at 841-48 (1971).

146. See, e.g., Hamburgers York Road, 41 T.C. 821 (1964) (holding
similar to Marc's Big Boy but couched in terms of "sham" and "tax
avoidance"). See generally the cases cited in note 120 supra.
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problem. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's decision in
First Security Bank may mean that the courts will now assert
traditional non-statutory limitations on the Commissioner's
power, as was done within the area of legal prohibitions against
receipt of income. As a result of these uncertainties it can be
expected that litigation in this area will increase, with taxpayers
seeking judicial restraint in delineating the boundaries of the
broad powers embodied in Section 482.

